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STATE BAR ASSOCIATION ANNUAL
REPORT.
The eighth annual report of the Penna.
Bar Association has been placed in the li-
brary. The report contains some interest-
ing statistics with reference to admission
to the Bar in this state. These statistics
are published in a table showing the num-
ber of successful and unsuccessful candi-
dates for registration and for admission to
the Bar of each County in the state. The
table shows that throughout the state,
during the year 1901, 1330 applications in
all were acted upon; 706 for registration
and 624 for admission. Of the latter, 187
were attorneys from other jurisdictions;
122 of these were admitted on the ground
of comity, 28 on results of examinations,
and 37, rejected; 539 students were regis-
tered, and 361 student candidates were ad-
mitted to the Bar. Exclusive of comity
admissions, there were 1208 applications
acted upon; 832 or 69 per cent. were from
nine counties having 20 or more applica-
tions each during the year; of the remain-
ing 876 applications, 264 were from coun-
ties with from 10 to 20 applications each,
and the balance of 112 were from counties
each with less than 10 applications.
Exclusive of Philadelphia,- the ratios for
the state for each 20,000 inhabitants are
1.01 for admission, 1.48 for registration^
Philadelphia county leads in the numn-
ber of admissions on law school diplomas;
Cumberland county comes next. The
presence of the University of Pennsylva-
nia Law School in the former county and
Dickinson School of Law in the liater is
responsible for these counties leading in
those admissions, the diplomas of these
schools being accepted in the counties in
which the schools are located. In Phila-
delphia 78, or 59 per cent. of the 131 ad-
missions, were on law school diplomas. In
Cumberland county 18,or 90 per cent. of the
20 students admissions, were on law school
diplomas. In Luzerne county 2, or 8 per
cent. of the 2.5 admissions, were on law
school diplomas.
In Lackawanna, Lycoming, Venango,
Lancaster counties there were no admis-
sions on diplomas.
There evidently is not much doing in a
legal way in Sullivan, Mifflin, Juniata,
Pike and Fulton counties. In neither of
these counties were there registrations or
admissions during the year.
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ANNUAL PRIZES.
The following is a list of the prizes to be
distributed at the close of the term:
THE WILLIAMi D. BOYER PRIZES.
William D. Boyer, A. M. LL. B., an
alumnus of the school and a member of
the Lackawana County Bar, has offered
four prizes of twenty-five dollars each, for
excellence in work to be indicated by the
dean.
Prize No. 1 is offered to the Middler
that shall do the best work in the Law of
Evidence.
Prize No. 2 is offered to the Junior that
shall do the best work in the Law of Con-
tracts.
The other two prizes can b competed
for only by members of one of the three
athletic teams, football, baseball and track.
Prize No. 3 will be given to such stu-
dent of any class, having the above quali-
fication, as passes the best examination in
the law of Torts, provided that his paper
shall not be inferior to any five submitted.
Prize No. 4 will be given to such stu-
dent of any class, having the above quali-
fication, as writes the best essay on the
Quashing of Indictments in Pennsylvania.
There must be at least three competitive
essays submitted, otherwise this prize will
not be awarded.
THE DEAN'S PRIZES.
A prize of $25 is offered to such Senior
as shall have done the best work in Con-
stitutional Law, Federal and State.
A prize of $25 is offered to. such Junior
as does the best work in the law of Real
Property.
ITEMS OF INTEREST ABOUT THE
SCHOOL.
The Junior class was subjected to a
special examination on the intestate laws
of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, on Jan-
uary 17th. The students residing in Penn-
sylvania were examined on the Pennsyl-
vania statutes, and the students residing
in New Jersey on the statutes of that
state.
The Senior class is receiving Corporations
under Dr. Trickett, and Partnership and
Bankruptcy under Professor Hutton. Bills
and Notes will follow Corporations, and
Landlord and Tenant, and Insurance, will
be taught after the class has finished Part-
nership and Bankruptcy. This will be the
first class to receive instruction on the sub-
ject of Landlord and Tenant. The subject
heretofore taught instead was Quasi Con-
tracts. The substitution of the former for
the latter subject was done at the request of
the class.
Delaney of the Senior class was seri-
ously ill during the beginning of the
present term.
The College Dramatic Club will produce
the comedy, "Charley's Aunt," some time
next month. Flynn and Lannard of the
Middle Class have been assigned promi-
nent parts.
The first basket ball game of this season
was played in the gymnasium, Friday
evening, January 16th, between Dickinson
and Allbright. The former won, the score
being 40 to 10. Prickett and Ammirman
were the Law men who participated. The
former played part of the second half.
During the time that he was in the game,
he threw four baskets, and his playing at
times was remarkably fast. His work has
been favorably commented upon since the
game, and it is hoped that he will be re-
tained as a regular member of the team.
Kurtzman of the Junior Class did not re-
turn after the Christmas vacation. He
has gone into the life insurance business.
Ed. Spencer, a student at Mercersburg
Academy, was a guest of his brother
Charles of the Middle class during the
fore part of the present month.
Miss Miller of the Junior class did not
return since the Christmas vacation. She
will continue her law studies in an office
in Scranton where she resides.
Jos. Boughton, a prominent member of
the McKean County Bar, has been ap-
pointed judge of that county to succeed
Judge Morrison, who has been appointed
a member of the Superior court, to succeed
Judge Mitchell. Judge Boughton has
been a member of the McKean County Bar
for 18 years, during which time he was
twice elected District Attorney, and was
identified with some of the largest cases
that were tried by that tribunal. His son
Victor is a member of the Senior class.
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Claycomb of the Middle class is becom-
ing prominent as a lecturer and an author.
During the summer -vacation he lectured
in the Methodist church in Alum Bank,
Pa., before a large audience. His subject
was "The Highway to Success." During
the past few weeks there appeared from
his pen in the Bedford County News an
interesting description of the Carlisle
Indian School, and its students. Accom-
panying the description were halftone cuts
of the school, of Major Pratt, and of several
members of the faculty.
Harvey Bu rkhouse, a member of last
year's Junior Class, who did not return
last fall, has resumed his studies with his
class since the present term began. Busi-
ness interests prevented his returning un-
til after the holidays.
Three new men have been enrolled as
members of the Junior Class since the
opening of the present term. They are:
Patterson, of Altoona, Pa; Tyler, of Port
Alleghany, Pa., and Wackerman, of York,
Pa.
Candidates for thebase ball team reported
for practice in the gymnasium, Saturday,
Dec. 17th. Wolf, Parks, Hassert, Reeser
and Setzer are the Law men who have re-
ported. Wolf will, no doubt, be selected
to catch on the varsity team. He is a fast
and experienced player, and will consid-
erably strengthen the team. While a stu-
dent at Mt. St. Mary's College he caught
for three years on the first team there, and
since graduating from that institution be
has played with some fast amateur teams
in the vicinity of his home, Johnstown,
Pa.
The Senior Class has organized a special
class in Practice. Senator Weakley has
charge of the class. One evening each
week he will lecture in the large lecture
room in the Law School.
For general excellency in their exami-
nation in Decedent's Estates the following
members of the Middle class were honor-
ably mentioned by Professor Hutton at
the opening of the present term: Ben-
jamin, Hillyer, Amerman and Albertson.
Neatness of work and knowledge of the
subject were the criteria upon which the
selections were based. The examination
which was conducted just before the close
of the last term was comprehensive but
not difficult.
The third of the series of mid-winter
dances that is being conducted by the
Comus Club, was held in the Armory, Fri-
day evening, January 16th. Among the"
law students who attended were: Wil-
son, Dively, Spencer, Benjamin, Prickett,
Hillyer, Kress, Vera, Heller, Gillespie,
Lloyd, Core, andLongbottom. Professor
Hutton was also present.
NEWS OF THE ALUMNI.
Daniel Kline of Freeland, a member of
the class of 1901, was recently appointed
Deputy Register of Wills of Luzerne
county. His office will be in Freeland,
and his jurisdiction will comprise the
lower end of the county. Luzerne is such
a large county and it is so inconvenient
for the residents of the southern part of
the county to reach the county seat, that
the Register of Wills usually appoints a
deputy in the southern district. There is
no compensation connected with the ap-
pointment. It is always given to a lawyer,
the theory being that the amount of prac-
tice that he will receive from performing
the duties of the office will sufficiently
compensate him for his labor.
Taylor '01 was in town during the hol-
idays. He is residing in Grand Encamp-
ment, Wyoming, and after qualifying
will practice law there. One year's resi-
dence in the state is required before appli-
cants for admission to the bar can take the
examination. He will be eligible to take
the examination in a few months.
Among the Alumni in town during the
present month were: Elmes '02; Kline '01;
Katz '01; Kern '01; Holcomb '01; Hess '01;
Thorne '02.
At the session of the Supreme Court in
Phila. this month, the following graduates
of Dickinson Law School were admitted
to practice in that Court: Katz '01 and
Tribley '98, of Phila. Co.; Haas '98, Schuyl-
kill Co.; Glennon '96, Holcomb '01, Lu-
zerne.
Mitchell '01 is employed in the legal
department of the Standard Oil Company.
At present he is located in West Virginia.
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Elmer Welsh, who was graduated last
June, was recently admitted to the York
county bar, having passed the exami-
nation prescribed by the court. of that
county.
Schnee, a member of last year's Middle
class, who did not return this year, was in
town during the present month. He was
admitted to the Lycoming County Bar in
November, and to the West Virginia bar
the early part of this month. He has not
yet decided where he will practice.
John '99 of Shamokin, was in town
for several days during the present month.
Geo. Brown '96 is engaged in the coal
business. He is a member of a corporation
composed principally of Philadelphia capi-
talists. The company owns a valuable
tract of coal land in the vicinity of Free-
land, and has begun to mine coal from it.
MOOT COURT.
WM. BECKER vs. PHILLIP WELD-
NER.
i'?egligence-Rights of a pedestrian-Icy
sidewalk-Failure of owner to remove
the ice.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Weidner had for twelve years owned a
house fronting on High St., and standing
back one foot from the pavement. The
waterfalling on the roof was conducted by a
spout to the western corner of the roof and
thence by a spout down the front of the
house to the distance of one foot above the
ground. The spout here had a bend, one
arm of it stretching nine inches along the
top of the ground and two inches above it.
On January 11th, 1899, the water run-
ning down the pipe had spread over the
pavement on its way to the gutter and had
frozen, and Becker, while walking on the
pavement, fell on the ice and was hurt.
He brings trespass. The borough author-
ized gutters of the kind in question.
CARLIN and CLAYCOMB for the plaintiff.
Owners of premises must not obstruct or
impede the passage of pedestrians.
Robert Todd v. City of Troy, 61 N. Y.
506; Pomfrov v. Village of Silver Springs,
104 N. Y. 459; McLaughlin v. City of
Corry, 27 Pa. 109.
DELANEY and HUBLER for the defend-
ant.
47 Pa. 300; 14 Gray 249; 93 N. Y. 12; 4
Cushing 365; 102 Mass. 329; 99 N. J. 654;
85 Pa. 293; 80 Pa. 373; 94 U. S. 469; 62 Pa.
353.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
Becker brings trespass for injuries re-
ceived by reason of a fall occasioned by
slipping on ice accumulated on a pave-
ment in front of Weidner's house. It ap-
pears from the statement of facts that the
borough authorized gutters of this kind,
and Weidner to preserve his property
from the drippings of the roof of his house,
constructed a pipe along the edge of the
roof, and thence down the side of the
building. The spout had a projection of
nine inches from the house, which was
within three inches of reaching the pave-
ment.
By the law of falling bodies, the water
would have had a sufficient velocity after it
left the orifice to strike directly on the
pavement, and this presents the import-
ant question for the consideration of the
court.
What are the rights of a person who is
lawfully using a pavement and is hurt by
slipping on ice that is caused by the arti-
ficial drainage placed there by the prop-
erty owner? If there was evidence on
which to base an opinion, the conclusion
would not be hard to reach, as it could
then be ascertained as to whether the
plaintiff was negligent in a contributory
manner or not, in attempting to walk on
the pavement in its icy condition. In 12
W. N. 409, the court held that even if the
borough was negligent in allowing a ridge
of ice to remain on the pavement, if a
person who was injured knew of its dan-
gerous condition and attempted to cross,
when he could have avoided the accident
by passing out into the street, he was
guilty of contributory negligence and
could not recover.
It is argued by counsel for the defend-
ant that the property owner had a reason-
able time in which to remove the ice, and
that the burden of proof is on the plaintiff
to show that such time has elapsed before
he can recover. We cannot agree with
this contention. All the legislation pro-
viding and cases holding that a property
owner has a reasonable time to remove
snow and ice from his pavement, have
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teference to the accumulation of snow and
ice from natural causes, over which the
property owner had no control. But no
case has gone so far as to apply this rule if
the owner has been the direct cause of the
water falling there, by means of a man-
trap, such as pipes of this kind are. Had
the defendant extended the spout to the
edge of the gutter underneath the pave-
ment, and the same results have followed,
the above rule would apply, but since he
-saw fit to allow the water to flow across
the sidewalk in an atmosphere such as we
have in this state in January, he certainly
knew that the foot-way would at times be
dangerous- to pedestrians. As the plain-
tiff has fully shown that the accident oc-
currtd on account of the slippery condi-
tion of the sidewalk, and as his right to
the sidewalk cannot be disputed, the pre-
sumption of law is in his favor, i. e., that
he acted as a reasonable. man would act.
The burden of proof is, therefore, on the
defendant to show that the plaintiff con-
tributed to the injury, and as he has not
offered any evidence to establish this fact,
we hold the plaintiff can recover.
The case in 192 Pa. 574, is not in point
with this case, as the person injured in
that case knew of the obstruction and
passed over it several times; besides the
chute in the above case was authorized by
the borough; in this case it was the gut-
ter and not the means the defendant used




OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
Had rain fallen on the pavement and
frozen, or had snow fallen, it might not
have been the duty of Weidner to Becker,
to remove it. Even though a valid munic-
ipal ordinance required Weidner to re-
move it, it would not result that a duty
would be thereby created toward Becker.
The breach of the ordinance might expose
to the imposed penalty, but give no right
of action to Becker. City of Rochester v.
Campbell, 123 N. Y. 405; Tremblay v.
Harmony Mills, 171 N. Y. 593; Hartford
v. Talcott, 48 Conn. 525; 2 Dillon, Munic.
Corp. pp. 1261, 1273, 1315.
Weidner's liability, if there is any,
arises not from the fact that water fell and
froze upon his pavement, or that it was al-
-lowed by him, after so falling and freez-
ing, to remain upon the pavement, but
from the fact that he caused it to fall
on the pavement. The rain dripping on
his roof was thrown into the spout along
its edge, and thence conducted in a stream
to the pavement below, over which it was
thus caused to spread, and on which to
freeze.
If he had, in freezing weather, thrown
several tubfulls of water over the pave-
ment, he would have been liable to such as,
in the careful use of the payment, suffered
harm. He as clearly causes the roof
water to come on the pavement, as if he
had cast it there from the tub. He has
built his roof and spout so that the water
comes to the pavement, and he has in-
tended that it should come to the pave-
nient. He would have done this with
impunity in the absence of an ordinance.
had nobody been hurt in consequence.
But somebody has been hurt.
It was not very strenuously suggested
that the injury to Becker was too remote.
By no means. Any sensible man would
anticipate that in cold weather, water on
the pavement would freeze,-that there
would be pedestrians, and that in attempt-
ing to walk on the icy portion of the
pavement, they would be in danger of
falling. Many might not fall, but if any
fall, Weidner must make reparation.
It is suggested that the borough by not
prohibiting spouts of the kind, assented
to them; nay, that it expressly authorized
them. Let us concede that it did. That
does not change the duty of Weidner
towards Becker. He has been invited to
use the foot-walk by the laying out of the
street, and the division of it into carriage
way and sidewalk. The borough cannot
so far legalize nuisances put on the pave-
ment by individuals, as to destroy their
duties toward pedestrians, to avoid mak-
ing it dangerous. An ordinance of that
import would be unreasonable, illegal and
void.
Should it be suggested that Becker
should have sued the borough, the answer
is at hand. The borough was, possibly,
negligent in allowing spouts to be so
maintained, that they would flood the
pavements with water, whioh, in cold
weather, would freeze. If it waa, it would
be liable to an action by Becker. But its
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negligence is distinct from Weidner's.
His is active; it's passive. He causes theI
water to flow on the sidewalk; it tolerates
or suffers his doing so. Each is liable for
his several act. That of one is not ab-
sorbed into the other's. Tremblay v.
Harmony Mills, 171 N. Y. 598.
Judgment affirmed.
JOHNSON vs. BROWN.
Constitutional law-Due process of law-
Limits of the police power of a state-
Seizure of gaming devices-Act of Mar.
8., 1860, P. L. 882.
STATEUENT OF THE CASE.
Plaintiff owned a musical slot machine,
which was summarily seized by the police
without any arrest or charge against the
owner, on the ground that it was a gamb-
ling device. It was shown that the
machine could be used for perfectly legiti-
mate purposes, such as operation as a
music box, or to register the number of
customers, etc., but that it could be used
for certain gambling devices. The con-
tention was that there was a taking of
property without due process of law with-
in the constitutional inhibition.
WALSH and DELANEY for plaintiff.
The act authorizing seizure violates
XIV Amendment of the Constitution.
Mode of seizing the property is not by due
process of law.
Mycodham v. The People, 13 N. Y. 378;
Murray v. Hoboken Co., 18 Howard 272;
Brown v. Hummel. 6 Pa. 86; Maugle v.
Kansas, 123 U. S. 678.
BISHOP and PEIGHTEL for the defend-
ant.
The act is constitutional. It is exercis-
ing the police power of the State. Crary
v. Kline, 65 Pa. 399; Am. & Eng. Encyc.
of Law, First Ed., Vol. 18 p. 75. The fact
that the machine could be used for legiti-
mate purposes does not take it out of the
class of devices intended by the statute.
State v. Lewis, 12 Wisc. 483.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
This is an action of replevin to recover
possession of a musical slot machine
which was summarily seized by the offi-
cers. We must presume that they were
acting under Act of Mar. 31, 1860, as the
ground given to justify the seizure was
that it was a gambling machine. The
Act of Mar. 31, 1860, after prohibiting var-
ious forms of gambling, and prescribing
penalties therefore, etc., declares: "It
shall be lawful for any sheriff, constable
or other officer of justice, with or without
warrant, to seize upon, secure and remove
any device or machine of any kind, char-
acter or description whatsoever, used and
employed for the purpose of unlawful gam-
ing, as aforesaid, etc. * * * * And it shall
be the duty of such officer to make return
in writing to the next term of Quarter
Sessions of the proper county, setting
forth the nature and description of the de-
vice, and the time, place and circumstance
under which such seizure was made; and
the said court, upon hearing the parties,
if they should appear, if satisfied that such
machine was employed and used as afore-
said, shall adjudge the same forfeited.
* * *- * Andsuchadjudicationshallbe
conclusive evidence to establish the legal-
ity of such seizure in any court of this
Commonwealth in any cause in which
the question of its legality shall arise; and
in any case in which a decree of forfeiture
shall not be pronounced, if said court shall
upon the evidence, be satisfied that there
was probable cause for the seizure, they
shall certify the same, which certificate
shall be a bar to any action brought
against the officer for or on account of
such seizure in those cases in which said
officer returns or offers to return such de-
vice or machine; and in all cases shall
prevent a recovery in damages for any
sum beyond the real value of the device or
machine seized." In the above act we
have a well defined mode of procedure in
such cases as the one at bar. This action
is permature, as there has certainly been
no such adjudication as required by the
act. Either the plaintiff or defendant can
push the matter to adjudication at the
hext term of Quarter Sessions, after which
the plaintiff, in this action, will have his
remedy in either trespass or replevin if
there is not sufficient evidence to warrant
a decree of forfeiture and the court does
not certify that there was probable cause
for said seizure. We think the provisions
of the above act are clear and amply war-
rant us in holding that replevin will not
lie until such adjudication has been made.
See Slovlin v. Com.,.l06 Pa. 369.
Then wehave following the above section
the following section of same Act (1860):
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"No writ ofreplevin shallissue forany de-
vice or machine seized as aforesaid, nor
shall any action be instituted for or on ac-
count of such seizure until the court shall
have first adjudicated on the premises;
but such writ or action shall forthwith on
motion be quashed and abated by the
court in which it shall be sued or bought."
The constitutionality ofthe Act of March
31, 1860, has been questioned by the plain-
tiff, claiming it deprives a person of his
goods without due process of law, which is
prohibitedbytheU. S. Constitution. Lord
Coke says that the words "Per Legem
Terrae" means by due process of law and
beig brought into court to answer ac-
cording to law. We find this statement
in Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, p.
362. Nor can a party by his misconduct
so forfeit a right that it may be taken
from him without judicial proceedings in
which the forfeiture shall be declared in
due form. The words "due process of
law" must be understood to mean that no
person shall be deprived by any form of
government action of either life, liberty
or property, except as the consequence of
some judicial proceeding appropriately
and legally conducted. Weynhawser v.
The People, 3 Kerrian. We are of the
opinion after a consideration of the above
authorities that "due process of law" is
provided for in the Act of March 31, 1860,
and as it has stood so long without being
declared unconstitutional we think it is
entirely in harmony with the provisions
of said constitution. We are, therefore, of
the opinion that the writ of replevin
should be quashed and is hereby quashed.
EBBERT, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
It is conceded that the plaintiff is en-
titled to recover, unless the 60th and 61st
sections of the act of March 31, 1860, 1 P.
& L. 1218, prevent. We omit a quotation
of these sections.
It will barely be questioned that the
legislature may authorize the taking and
confiscating of property used or intended
to be used for illegal purposes, e. g.,
liquors, gambling devices, burglars' tools.
If it can fine $500 or $1,000 it can also for-
feit specific property.
The device in this case is a "musical
slot machine" and it can be put to legiti-
mate as well as to illegitimate uses. But,
if it was in fact being put or being in-
tended immediately to be put to illegiti-
mate uses, it can be confiscated. Such
has been held with regard to nets, used in
unlawful fishing. Lawton v. Steele, 152U.
S. 133; or to oleomargarine, Powell v.
Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678; or liquors,
kept for the purpose of unlawful sale,
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623. The
,penalty of loss of ownership of the res, is
no more objectionable than any other
penalty. Of. Long v. Rainivater, 70 Mo.
152.
The act of 1860 authorizes the seizure of
the articles without a warrant. The re-
quirement of a warrant is inter alia for
the purpose of obtaining the responsibility
of some other person than the officer, for
the existence of a probable cause. But an
officer can at common law, arrest without
warrant in certain cases. The constitu-
tional principle found in section 8, Art. 1,
of the state constitution, does not preclude
the extension of the officer's power thus to
arrest or to seize, to cases similar to this.
Had the act of 1860 authorized the offi-
cer, on his own opinion of the nature or
destination of the slot machine, to destroy
it, it would probably have been unconsti-
tutional; the owner, in that case, would
have been deprived of his property with-
out the adjudication of a judicial officer of
any kind. Allowing him in a subsequent
action against the officer, to show that
the property was not of the sort of which
it was assumed by the officer to be, and,
if he showed it, to recover damages, would
not satisfy the constitutional requirement.
The owner cannot be deprived of his prop-
erty on the mere chance of getting com-
pensation for it from one from whom com-
pensation may not be able to be wrung by
fi.fa. or capias. Of. Wendt v. Craig, 67
Pa. 424; Craig v. Kline, 65 Pa. 399; Philada.
v. Scott, 81 Pa. 80.
The act of 1860 requires the officer to
make return of the seizure to the next
Court of Quarter Sessions. That court is to
hear the parties, and is then to deter-
mine whether the device was used for un-
lawful gaming. If the decision is that it
was so used, it is to be destroyed ; other
wise it is to be restored to the owner.
The owner is to be dispossessed simply,
until the hearing. His final loss of the
-property through its destruction, depends
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on the conclusion of the court. Is the
provision adequate?
No trial by jury is provided, but, while
the constitution of the State ordains that
the right of trial by jury shall be as here-
tofore, there always have been modes of
trial of facts which did not include the
employment of a common law jury. The
liability of a county or city for destruction
by mobs, can be assessed without such a
jury; In re Pennsylvania Hall, 5 Pa. 204.
The forfeiture of loose logs allowed to
float down the Susquehanna, can be in-
flicted by a justice of the peace without a
jury. Wendt v. Craig, 67 Pa. 424. Cf.
Van Swarton v. Commonwealth, 24 Pa.
130. In Kennedy v. Board of Health, 2 Pa.
366, it seems to have been conceded that a
board of health could abate nuisances at
the expense of individuals, and make
its judgment as to the fact that the things
alleged to be, were in fact nuisances, con-
elusive. Cf. Philada. v. Provident, etc.
Trust Co.. 132 Pa. 224; Byers v. Common-
wealth, 42 Pa. 89. We think that the
trial of the fact in question, could be de-
puted to the court sitting without'ajury.
The constitutional provision that no-
body shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law, is invoked.
The 9th section of Art. 1, of the state con-
stitution, enacts "nor can he (j. e. one ac-
cused of crime) be deprived of his life, lib-
erty or property, unless by the judgment
of his peers or the law of the land." This
clause is not applicable to the case before
us. The proceeding is not founded on the
guilt of Johnson. The use of the machine
may have been by another than the
owner, by a lessee, or borrower. Besides,
it does not appear that Johnson has been
accused. We do not understand that the
officer could not seize the machine with-
out also arresting the person who was oper-
ating it. But, even if the clause quoted is
applicable, it simply requires the judg-
ment of Johnson's peers, or the law of the
land. The law of the land does not al-
ways prescribe, as we have seen, a trial
by peers, i. e. by jurors. To condemn to
forfeiture by a judge, is to condemn ac-
cording to the "law of the land" in a con-
titutional sense.
But the objection to the act is, that it
provides for a depriving of property with-
out due process of law i. e., in defiance of
the first section of the 14th Amendment of
the Federal Constitution. Infringement
of this amendment must be found, if at all,
(a) in the annexation of the result of de-
struction to the having, for gambling pur-
poses, of a slot-machine, or (b) in the pro
vision for asoertaining the fact by a judge.
We find no prohibition upon states,
against making all property used for il-
licit purposes forfeit and dooming it to de-
struction. The state can forbid the pro-
duction of beer, wine or oleomargarine or
the having it for the purpose of sale, under
a penalty of destruction. It matters not
that the substance is capable of effecting
some useful and desirable objects. The
mischief to be apprehended from its con-
tinued existence, may, in the judgment of
the legislature, exceed the good. Though
the musical slot machine may serve es a
music box, or to register the number of
customers, this will not compel the legis-
lature to tolerate it, if it may be and in fact
is used for illicit purposes. The state may
deem it better to do without the possible
good, in order to escape the probable evil.
The requirement of "due process of law"
does not make a trial by jury necessary.
Says Cooley, whom for bonvenience we
may here quote, "The states, therefore,
may prescribe their own modes of proceed-
ing and trial; the accusation may be by
grand jury or withobt one; the trial by
jury or by.court." Const. Law 245.
It does not appear whether the replevin
was begun before the close of the next
session of the Quarter Sessions or not.
We must assume that it was, and for this'
reason we think the decision of the learned
court below correct. Had the policeman
neglected to make return to this court as
the act of 1860 requires, it is probable that
he would become a trespasser ab initio,
and that Johnson could recover the slot
machine in this replevin. The prohibition
in the 61st section of -the act of 1860 was
intended to prevail, only when the officer
complied with the directions of the 60th
section, and invoked in due time, the
judgment of the court.
Judgment affirmed.
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WHITE vs. PA. ROLLING MILL CO.
Bill in equity-Circulation of portrait-
Right of privacy-Jurisdiction of equity
-Bill dismissed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Complainant, a beautiful young lady,
files a bill against the defendant company
and asks the court that the said company
be restrained and enjoined from circulating
her portrait in the shape of lithographic
prints, for the purpose of advertisement.
The prints were upon flour sacks with the
words below, "Our Pride" and above the
same, "Penna. Rolling Mill Co." There
were no contractural relations between
the parties, and it is not known just how
the company came into possession of the
portrait, but it was not with the consent or
-with the approval of the complainant. It
is not contended that the portrait is libel-
ous. Complainant alleges that she has
been humiliated and her good name in-
jured, causing distress of mind and body
by reason of the above fact.
SHEBBINE and WRIGHT for the com-
plainant.
Courts recognize the right of property in
pictures and will restrain publication by
others than the owner. 16 Am. and Eng.
Enc. of L. 442.
Equity will interfere to prevent a viola-
tion of personal legal rights. Pollard v.
Photographic Co., L. R. 40 Ch. Div. 345;
Corliss v. Walker, 57 Fed. R. 434.
BOuTON for the defendant.
The right of privacy has been specifi-
cally denied. Robertson v. Rochester
Folding Box Co., 64 N. E. Rep. 442. Plain-
tiff must recover, if at all, at common law,
and there is no recovery in absence of libel.
Atkinson v. J. E. Doherty & Co., 48 L.
R. A. 220; Cooley, Const. Lim., 6th Ed.,
518.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
It was with some hesitation that the
Court finally decided to dismiss the bill of
the complainant in this suit. A doubt
arose as to whether or not weight of author-
ity and long established precedents should
not be disregarded and the case be decided
upon principle. The issue was decided, as
frequently before, by principle giving way
to precedent.
In 124 U. S., 210, it was said that the of-
fice and jurisdiction of a court of equity,
unless enlarged by express statute, were
limited to the protection of the rights of
property. This has long been the rule both
in the English and the American Courts,
and although we admit a tendency in the
American Courts to go further in the pro-
tection of one's rights, it has only been in
cases where the injury complaued of is of
a material nature and not a mere injury to
the feelings, as appears in the present suit.
It was expressly laid down in a case re-
ported in 46 L. R. A., 219, that an injury
to the feelings was a wrong for which the
law afforded no remedy.
The complainant also contends that right
of privacy is a form of property and as such
is and has been protected. The cases in
which such a right was protected were
those involving a breach of contract, trust
or confidence, three elements which do not
enter into the case at bar. A case tried in
New York and ieported in the American
Law School Review, presents a similar
statement of facts as appears in the suit at
bar. In rendering the majorityopinion of
the Court, Justice Parker said that "the
'so-called right of privacy' has not yet
found an abiding place in our jurispru-
dence." We think that the law laid down
in that suit was but the re-affirmance of an
established precedent. Thecaseon which
complainant mainly relies is that of Cor-
liss v. Walker, reported in 31 L. R. A.,
283. We are of the opinion that this case
is not in point and will not support their
contention. It appears by the report of
that case that the injunction was granted
because of the breach of conditions an-
nexed to the contract. That part of Jus-
tice Colt's opinion cited by the complainant
we think is merely dicta, and doubt that
it is supported by the weightof authority.
It has been decided that equity has no
power to restrain a libelous publication,
surely, then, afortiori, it would not have
the power to enjoin one not alleged to be
libelous.
Still another potent reason for refusing
to allow the bill in this suit is the fact that
by the Constitution of the U. S. freedom
of speech and of thdpress is granted, where-
by the publication of any article or any-
thing is allowed just so long as such pub-
lication is not in violation of the laws of
society respecting blasphemy, decency,
etc., and does not amount to a public offense
or cause material injury to other persons,
none of which is alleged in the case at bar.
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As stated supra, we are of the opinion,
arrived at with some hesitancy, but
founded on the weight of authority, that
the bill should be dismissed and the con-
plainant pay the costs.
Judgment affirmed.
KRESS, J.
OPINTION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The first question, in this case, is has
the defendant violated and is it threaten-
ing to violate any right of the plain tift? It
is vaguely suggested that the plaintiff has a
right of "privacy," a right "to belet alumne,"
and that in some way this right is violat-
ed by the acts of the defendant.
What is "privacy ?" Miss White can, if
she wishes to, seclude herself. Shemay re-
fuse to receive visitors, refrain from appear-
ance on the street, in church, in the ball-
room, in the theatre. She may refrain
from writing or speaking, or otherwise
acting in the presence of others, and thus
conceal her emotions and thoughts. This
privacy has not been violated.
Has Miss White the right to go to
church or upon the street, without being
seen? Must others avert or close their
eyes, lest they fall upon her visage, and
retinal pictures are obtained from it,
which translate themselves into visions,
sights of her?
She cannot well live at all except in an
East Indian Zenana, without having pic-
tures of her face made in the minds of her
fellow-creatures, be that face beautiful or
ugly, a cause of admiration or of disgust.
The very pigs and dogs on the street
steal impressions of it, as they turn their
glances upon her, but she has no redress
for this degradation of her divine features.
If she wishes to prevent pictures of herself
in swines' eyes, she must take care not to
come into the range of those eyes. No
chancellor will assist her.
But, pigs are not printers, and dogs do
not practice photography. It is supposed
that while she cannot compel her fellow-
men to close their eye$ as she passes, so
that they may not see her, she has a right
that they shall not assist others, who do
not see her, to form images of her appear-
ance. She wants to limit the publication
of her face. to the very persons to whom
she shows it. But has she such a right?
There are two ways by which others can
receive notions of her face, pictorial .and
graphical. A delineation byphotography,
or engraving, or painting. A verbal de-
scription may be made.
We have not understood that, when one
has seen a fellow-creature's face, be it
beautiful or ugly, he is by law forbidden to
describe it, ever so vividly, accurately, and
realistically. He can describe it to one or
20, or 1000, or 10,000 people. No English
court has heretofore laid a fetter on the
tongue or the pen merely to prevent its
truly describing a human countenance.
Nor can it matter before what audience
the description is given.
What is the difference between a picture
and a description, except that the former
awakens an image in the mind without
the aid of imagination, while the latter
simply stimulates the imagination through
the word-associations and that the reali-
zation of the actual face through the former
is more complete and firm, than through
the latter? It is safe to say that no right
has thus far been recognized, in the owner
of a face, that an image of it shall not be
fashioned in other minds through pictures
of it, or descriptions of it.
The common law has dealt with the
subject and by the limitations it has pre-
scribed indicates pretty clearly what sort
of right to privacy in this regard there
shall be. The truth at common law was
no protection to a pictorial representation
that would expose one to hatred, contempt,
ridicule, etc. Occasionally nature afflicts
people with oddities and imperfections
that produce laughter or contempt, or
disgust, and the publication of representa-
tions of these oddities and imperfections
would not bejustified by its veracity. But,
the common law did not prohibit and
punish publications of pictures of men that
evoked praise, admiration, homage.
But, the recognition by common law of
an alleged right is not necessary to its
existence. The chancellor, from time to
time created rights, or as he would some-
times prefer saying, furnished remedies
for already existing rights, which had been
recognized to exist, neither by statute nor
by the common law, and the effort now
is, to induce the chancellor either to create
and protect a new right, or to protect what
he may be pleased to declare to be an old
right that has never yet had definition or
defence in the law.
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It is a fashion, nowadays, when any
body discovers what ought to be, in his
judgment, a right, to appeal to the court of
equity to make it such. It was very well,
in centuries when parliaments were in-
frequent, and when the topics with which
they dealt were few, and the mass of their
legislation extremely small, according to
modern standards, to ask the chancellor to
legislate. For political reasons, the king
would not convoke parliament, or quickly
-prorogued or dissolved it. Its time, when
it was in session, was occupied almost ex-
clusively by matters deemed important by
the executive. But for thebeneficentusur-
pations of the chancellor, civilization could
not well have advanced as it did, unless,
perhaps, these very usurpations, making
parliament the less necessary, were one
-rea~on for their very infrequency and in-
fertility.
The present conditions are very different.
We have biennial legislatures, each turn-
ing out as many statutes as wereformerl.V
created ift a half-century. Their very ob-
ject, if fit object at all they have, is to watch
the course of civilization, and to adapt to
it (he institutions, laws and procedures of
the State. If a new right is to be created,
the legislature is in Harrisburg to create it.
If the time has come to recognize a so-
called right of privacy, surely the legisla-
ture is the only body that can authenti-
cally declare it. To itshould beaddressed
the considerations that have been urged in
this court. If convinced that there should
be a right of privacy, let them enact it, de-
fine it, provide means civil or criminal for
defending it. That it is irksome to do this,
that success would be doubtful, is surely
no good reason for appealing to a chancel-
lor. It is far better, if commands not to
publish physiognomies are to be issued,
that they should be directed to the people
generally, and not to a particular individ-
ual by way of rescript or ukase, that the
punisliment for violation should be know-
able in advance, and not depend on the
unpredictable caprice of a chancellor, and
that, in administering the punishment the
judge should not be inflamed by any feel-
ing'that the defendant has defied his per-
sonal authority, a feeling which is insep-
arable from the decree of a chancellor for
so-called "contempt." The very word is
suggestive of the point of view from which
he contemplates the delict of the defend-
ant. More than this, it is very desirable
that the right of trial by jury should be
preserved, as it is not, when the chancel-
lor first launches the command, then de-
clares its infraction, and then fulminates
the penalty for contempt. It is equally
important that the constitutional maxim
against ex postfacto laws should be ob-
served, and it is not observed, when, after
the fact, the chancellor defines the punish-
ment.
It may doubtless be replied, that such
considerations as these would have pre-
vented many modern and useful exten-
sions made by the chancellors of their
jurisdiction. So they would. It is un-
doubted that the courts, especially the
courts of equity, have asssumed powers
from time to time, which it would hav.
been better for them to have received from
the ostensible law-maker, the legislative
branch, and the very citation of these as-
sumptions, acquiesced iu, as justifications
for fresh ones, is one of the strongest ob-
jections to their having been made. What
then? Are we frankly to avow the prin-
ciple that the chancellor can create new
rights and give remedies for them, either
openly or under the pretense of simply
recognizing old rights and applying old
remedies, or are we to adhere to the theory
of the tripartite division of functions, and
insist that not the chancellor, but the
general assembly, shall legislate? The
old law forbade pictures tending to bring
a man into contempt, etc. The proposed
new law is to forbid pictures, true to their
beautiful originals, and not tending to
bring the originals into contempt. Thus
to change the law ought surely to be under-
taken by the so called law-making organ,
and not by the law-executing department
of which the courts are a branch.
It appears that over the picture of the
plaintiff, the defendant has priuted the
words "Our Pride." While the picture
itself would not be libelous, we are not pre-
pared to say that if these words awaken
any suggestions that tend to lessen the
respect of people for the plaintiff, they
might not be treated as libelous. Words
of praise, used ironically, might be slander-
ous. The very fact that the defendant has
printed the face of the plaintiff, with the
words annexed, may indicate a want of
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respect, on its part, and so tend to beget a
want of respect on the part of the public,
or so expose the plaintiff to the raillery,.
chaffing, of her friends, acts which may
imply iu a mild form a lessened respect;
or may suggest a familiarity on the part of
some officer or member of the corporation
with the plaintiff that will tend to di-
minish the public confidence or esteem.
But, the common law has provided for the
case, if these are correct suppositions. It
has furnished a penalty, as also damages.
This is its method of prohibiting. Is the
chancellor to invent another method? If
he thinks the penalty for embezzlement
insufficient, is he to launch an injunction
against it, and punish for contempt? Or
if he thinks an action for damages would
yield an insufficient compensation, is he
for this reason to issue the injunction?
We cannot convince ,ourselves that the
plaintiff needs or can have other redress
for the libel, if libel there be, than that
provided by the law.
It is to be observed, however, that "it is
not contended that the portrait is libel-
ous," and this, apparently, means that the
entire publication, words as well as pic-
ture, is not to be regarded as libelous.
For the reasons imperfectly indicated,
we accept the doctrineof Roberson v. Roch-
ester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, and
of the learned court below.
Decree affirmed.
CANNING CO. vs. ARTHUR FAKE.
Contracts illegal-Public policy-Rescis-
sion, wrongful appropriation of consti-
tution, no ground for.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
The plaintiff" corporation desired to 'se-
cure certain legislation at Harrisburg. It
employed the defendant to secure the pas-
sage of the bill, and gave him $5,000 to use
with members of the legislature. Instead
of so using it, he appropriated it to his
own use, and made no effort to pass the
bill. The plaintiff sues to recover the
$5,000.
HILLYER AND KNAPPENBERGER for the
plaintiff.
The contract is yet executory, hence
company may rescind. Parsons on Con-
tracts, vol. 2, p. 146.; Spring Co. v. Knowl-
ton, 103 U. S. 49.
Courts grant relief when parties are not
n pari delicto. H. and E. Enc., 2d ed.,
vpl. 15, p. 1004; Parkersburg v. Brown,
106 U. S. 487 ; Spring Co. v. Knowlton,
supra; Adams v. Goodnow, 101 Mass. 81;
Worcester v. Eaton, 11 Mass. 368.
:UBLER for the defandant.
Courts will not enforce a contract which
is illegal, or inconsistent with sound mo-
rality or public policy. 149 Pa. St. 379; 88
Wallace, (U. S.) 561; 100 Pa. St. 561.
Contract to secure passage of an act by
payment of money to legislators, is void .s
against public policy. 5 Watts and Sar-
geant 315; 16 Howard U. S. 314.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The question to be decided in this case
seems to be whether or not the plaintiff
can rescind an illegal executory contract
and recover back the $5,000 paid to defend-
ant. A number of cases have been cited
to show that the contract in this case is
illegal, but under the view we take of the
law it will not be necessary to decide that
point.
A s far back as 1780, it was held in Eng-
land by the Court of King's Bench in the
case of Lowry v. Bourdieu, 2 Doug. 468,
that there was a well defined distinction
between executory and executed contracts,
and that so long as an illegal contract re-
mained executory, it might be rescinded
and money paid on it recovered.
In that case Justice Buller cites and ap-
proves the doctrine of a case of Walker v.
Chapman, saying: "There was a case of
Walker v. Chapman some years ago in this
court in which money had been paid to
secure a place in the customs. The place
had not been procured and the party who
paid the money having brought his action
to recover it back, it was held that he
should recover because the contract was
executory." This case seems to be parallel
with the case at bar.
In the case of White v. The Franklin
Banks, 22 Picks (Mass.) 181, this doctrine
was affirmed, and Wilde, J., in a very full
and exhaustive opinion traces the doctrine
back through the common law, conclud-
ingby saying "this was definitely settled as
the law in Anbert v. Walsh, 3 Tant 277,
and it does not appear that it has since
been doubted. The distinction seems to
be founded in wise policy,,as it has a tend-
ency in some. measure to prevent execu-
tion of unlawful contracts and can in no
way work injustice to either party."
In Forscht v. Green, 53 Pa. 138, and in
McAllister v. Hoffman, 16 S & R. 146, it
was held that where one had deposited
money with a stakeholder on a gambling
contract he could recover it from the stake-
holder by giving notice not to pay it to the
winner. The same doctrine was held in
Morgan v. Beaumont, 121 Mlass. 7.
In Peters et al v. Grim, 149 Pa. 163, and
McNaughton Co. v. Haldeman, 160 Pa.
145, it was held that where money wos
placed in a stock broker's hands on a gain-
bling contract, if the profits had been dis-
posed of and nothing remained in the
hands of the broker but the amount of the
original deposit, this money might be re-
covered. In the former case, Justice Alit-
chell said "If when the first deposit was
made by the plaintiff with directions to
buy the stock, he had countermanded the
directions before anything was done under
them, it could not be pretended that the
defendant could have retained the money
on the ground of the illegality in the con-
templated transaction."1
If the plaintiff in this case were seeking
to enforce an illegal contract it is plain lie
could not suceed, but as he is notseeking
to enforce it, and, on the other hand, is
seeking to rescind itand recover the moniy
paid on it, we can see no reason why I(,
should not be allowed to do so.
The contract is executory, the defendant
has done absolutely nothing toward carry-
ing out its terms, and we think it would
he unjust and illegal to allow the defend-
ant to keep the $5,000 paid to him by the
plaintiff.
Judgment is therefore entered for plain-
tiff:
WILSON, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
Fake was employed by the company "to
secure the passage"l of a bill through the
legislature. Five thousand dollars were
given to him, not as compensation for his
own services, but to be distributed among
the members of the legislature. That such
an object was illegal, there can be no
doubt. Cf. Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, 5W.
& S. 315; Spalding v. Ewing, 149 Pa.
375; Clark, Cont. 420. On such a contract
no suit could be maintained. Fake could
not recover from the company compen-
sation for his services, nor the company
from Fake for the neglect or unskilful and
therefore ineffectual effort of Fake to ob-
tain the passage of the act.
There are cases which hold that, after
A has put money or other property into
B's hands, in order that B may by means
of it procure an illegal result, A may re-
pent before the use of the money or prop-
erty and sue to recover it back. A locus
poenitentiae is conceded to him. Peters
v. Grim, 149 Pa. 163. It is sounder policy
to allow the party effectively to repent,
even with the aid of the court, before the
time arrives for the improper use of the
money, than to make repentance fruitless.
But, we see no sign of repentance in the
case before us. The money was allowed
to remain with Fake during the session
of the legislature. The complaint now is,
not that he had been notified not to use it,
and to return it, but that he had "made
no effort to pass the bill," i. e. to buy
the votes necessary to pass it. What ap-
pears before us then is simply a breach of
the contract the company had fully per-
formed, putting the money into Fake's
hands to corrupt the legislators. It then
awaited the performance by Fake of his
part of the contract. It was disappointed.
Fake thought it more profitable to him,
having the money, to spend it for his own
behoof, than upon the venial legislators
who impart to Harrisburg its carrion odor.
The company's suit is not by way- of re-
scission, but for the breach of the contract.
Had Fake used the money in even unsuc-
cessful bribery, surely the company could
not audaciously expect to recover it. The
non-appropriation of it to the ends contem-
plated is the gravamen of the cause.
It does not appear that Fake contracted
to return so much of the $5,000 as he did
not spend. His contract was to spend it,
and he has failed to'keep his contract, in
that he did not spend it. To assist him to
recover the money, is virtually to assist
him to recover damages for the non-per-
formance of Fake's promise. It is true
that had the promise been kept possibly
the coveted bill would have been enacted.
and possibly this bill turned into law
would have been worth to the company
$20,000. But, what the company lost was
simply the probability of the passage of the
bill, if $5,000 were spent upon ,the Harris-
burg statesmen,and that probability would
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be worth less than the law itself. Whether
the $5,000 would be the maximum damage
recoverable or not, it is substantially sought
a damages. Cf. Am. & Eng. Encyc. 998,
1001.
But let us suppose that the theory on
which the action proceeds is that of rescis-
sion. An objection to it would be, that re-
scission is not allowed simply because of
non-performance by the opposite party.
Another is that it would be as seriously
against sound public policy to permit re-
scission when the contract had been illegal
and no repentance before the period of per-
formance had supervened, as to allow an
action on the contract for non-performance.
The company had allowed the $5,000 to re-
main with Fake, during the session of the
legislature,in the expectation thathe would
spend it on the legislators. It Is when it
discovers that he has not done so, that it
claims the money back, instead of demand-
ing damages for non-performance. Sout:d
policy requires that it shall take the risk,
when it makes a contract of this flagitious
sort, of the loss of all that it adventures
upon it. If it knows that, should the other
party not do what he promises, it can se-
cure the aid of the court to compel him at
least to pay back what has been paid him,
it will be tempted to take the compara-
tively little hazard. Nay, the right to re-
cover back the money may be more valu-
able than that to secure damages. Thus,
on a trial for damages, the jury might find
that the act, if passed, would not have beeii
worth to the plaintiff $5,000. It mightalso
find that the chances of securing the act,
even had the money been expended, would
not be worth more than one-half of the
value of the act passed. To allow the com-
pany to recover the money is to lessen the
incentives to abstain from entering into
such contracts.
To expose Fake to the danger of having
to repay the money unless he does what
he promises, is also to give him an incen-
tive to do what he has promised, viz: to
corrupt the legislature. Surely a sound
policy requires that he should know that
whether he does what he agrees to do or
refrains from doing it, the money cannot
be taken from him.
It is well settled that if a contract is per-
formed on both sides, however illegal,
neither party can rescind and recover back
the consideration furnished by him. There
is no good reason for holding that when it
has been performed on one side, the per-
forming party can rescind and recover
back the consideration furnished by him.
It is" true that in the latter case the non-
performing party has an inequitable ad-
vantage over the other, but it is not for tl)e
courts to redress inequities between parties
which have arisen from a contract made
to the detriment of the public and of the
state. They should understand that they
must repose solely on the honor of their
co-contractors, and not at all upon the
coercive power of the courts. It is better
to employ a rogue to punish a confederate
rogue, than to encourage roguery by pro-
tecting one of them from the other.
Judgment reversed.
WILLIAM THORPE vs. EDWARD
ENSTEIN.
Tort- Trespass-Nuisance-Noxious gases
-Damage to growing crops-Jurisdic-
tion of equity- Pa. Coal Co. v. ,Sander-
son distinguished and discussed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Thorpe owns a parcel of land, having
acquired title to the same on April 1st,
1895.
Enstein, on April 1st, 1900, bought an ad-
joining tract on which was a bed of clay,
and for the purpose of manufacturing the
same into brick, he subsequently erected
a brick kiln and engaged in the making of
brick. The fuel used was stone coal.
In the summer of 1902, after the business
had been in operation for two years, a kiln
was fired and smoke and gases from same
settled upon the field of Thorpe on which
corn was growing. The corn was injured
to theextent of $50. Thorpe sues Enstein.
WILLIS and GILLESPIE for the plain-
tiff.
The business is a nuisance. Wood on
Nuisances, sec. 3. No man's property can
be taken directly or indirectly, without
compensation under the law of the state.
Houck v. Pipe Line, 153 Pa. 375.
If the business affects the useof property
or the health of its occupants, even though
a proper business conducted in a proper
manner, damages will be assessed. Robb
v, Carnagie, 145 Pa. 324; McKeon's v.
Lee. 51 N. Y. 500; Rylands v. Fletcher,
L. R. 3 H. L. 330; Rhodes v. Dunbar, 57
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Pa. 274; Susq. Fertilizer Co. v. Mahon, 0
L. R. A. 737: Davis v. Saylor, 1.43 Mass.
289. The measure of damages is the loss of
crops, together with permanent injuries.
Robh v. Carnagie, supra. Trespass is the
proper remedy. Huckenstein's Appeal,
70 Pa. 102.
AmF.wrAx and SHomo for the defend-
ant.
An owner may develop the natural re-
sources of his own land in the absence of
negligence without paying incident dam-
ages to neighboring property. Penna.
Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa 162;
Harvey v. Susq. Coal Co., 201 Pa. 63;
Penna. R. R. v. Marchant, 119 Pa. 542;
Pfeiffer v. Brown, 165 Pa. 267; Burnard
v. Sheley, 135 Ind. 547; Railroad v.
Oakes, 94 Tex. 155.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
Action of trespass by A for injury to his
growing corn, caused by smoke and gases
from defendant B's brick kilns.
The defendant relies almost solely on
the case of Sanderson v. Penna. Coal Com-
pany, 113 Pa. 143. In this case the land
was coal land; its value could be realized
in ,Lo other way than by bringing the
coal to the surface so that it could be pre-
pared for market. The damage was
caused by water which was found on the
land, and of necessity must be removed in
order to produce the coal. The water was
something which was found on the land-
put there by nature and not brought on
by the defendants.
It was discharged from the mines while
the defendants were actually developing
their own land.
The main ground for the decision was
that of necessity. The company must op-
erate its land where the lands lie; and,
not to allow the acidulated water which
nature created to be removed and deposited
in the natural water channels, would stop
the development of the property. The dis-
charge of water was the natural and neces-
sary result of the development by the
owner, of the resources of his land.
The case at bar can be distinguished from
the Sanderson case in many particulars.
To those already mentioned, the folIdwing
may be added: (1) The clay had already
been taken from the land when injury
odcurred. (2) The injury complained of
was caused by smoke and gases emitted by
defendant's kilns while he was manufac-
turing a finished article from a raw ma-
terial. (3) The defendant could have trans-
ported the clay to a place where it could be
manufactured into brick without injury to
anyone. (4) It is not necessary to make
brick on the land where the clay may be
found. (5) The making of brick was not
the necessary and natural result of the de-
velopment of the defendant's land.
Had the injury been caused while the
land was actually being developed, prob-
ably the Sanderson case would apply.
The facts in Huckenstine's Appeal, 70
Pa. 102, are similar to those now before us.
In that case the plaintiff sought to enjoin
the defendant from burning brick on his
lands and the Court said in refusing the in-
junction: "After a careful and full con-
sideration of the case we are compelled to
reverse the decree of the Court of Common
Pleas and dismiss the bill of the plaintiff
at his cost; but, without predjudice to any
right they may have to recover in an ac-
tion at law."
The defendant also contends that where
a man manufactures the products of his
land into finished articles on the land
where the material is produced, he is not
liable for injuries done to his neighbor's
lands if his business is a lawful business
and conducted with care.
We do not concede this to be the law.
It is no defence to say that the business is
a lawful business and has been conducted
with care when the neighbor's lands have
been injured in consequence of the business
carried on there. Bamford v. Turnley, 9
Jur. U. S. 377. The escape of gas and
smoke might cause a man to lose his farm,
or might be compelled to lease it, simply
because the business which brought about
the loss was a lawful business and carried
on carefully.
No man's property can be taken directly
or indirectly without compensation under
the law of this State. Houck v. Pipe Line,
153 Pa. 375. Hence there are cases, and a
great many of them, where the defendant
is held liable in damages although his
business is lawful and carefully conducted.
Robb v. Carneige, 145 Pa. 324. Houck v.
Pipe Line, &upra.
It is true that in the cases above cited,
the things that did the injury were brought
on the land, but we are of the opinion that
a recovery would have been allowed in
these cases, especially in Robb v. Carneige,
if the coal was mined on the land.
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We believe that the extension of the
doctrine of Sanderson v. Coal Co., to cases
of the kind now before us would be at-
tended with serious consequences.
A man might be the owner of a bed of
clay which was surrounded on all sides by
large wheat fields of other persons, and to
allow him to make this clay into bricks,
and by the burning process destroy the
crops of all his neighbors without any
liability on his part, would be a cruel
wrong which the law will not permit.
Judgment for plaintiff for fifty dollars.
ALBERTSON, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The question presented in this case is
simple. Can Enstein convert the clay
found on his land into bricks, by a pro-
cess which involves injury to the corn
grown on Thorpe's land?
The injury is caused by smoke and gas.
It does not appear that the use of a process
which leads to the emission of smoke and
gas is negligent, nor that by practicable
means such smoke and gas could, if
generated, be prevented from reaching
Thorpe'sland. We shall assume that En-
stein could notturn hisclay into brick"s, on
these premises, without the generation of
the gas and smoke, and that, these being
generated, he could not restrain them
within the boundaries of his own premises
It will follow that either Enstein must ab-
stain from making brick out of clay upon
these premises, or that Thorpe must suffer
a total or partial loss of the crops which,
otherwise, he would be able to raise.
Vaguely speaking, one man has no right
to produce by the pursuit of a business, in-
jury to another. The exceptions, however,
are innumerable. There are cases in
which, though injury fo" one man is
wrought by the business of another, equity
will not restrain its prosecution, but courts
of law will give compensation. There are
others in which the person injured can
neither secure an injunction nor even dam-
ages. He must meekly and patriotically
suffer because his injurer is in some'sense
serving the public, by the business from
which the injury springs, or because he is
only one of some dozens or hundreds who
suffer a like injury. Of the latter case,
Pa. Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, is a
specimen. Coal mining is very useful to
the State; it must be done where the coal
is; it cannot be done without acidulating
the water of the natural streams in the
neighborhood. Therefore, the riparian
owners shall not even have damages. The
mine owner shall be permitted to mine,
for his own advantage, though he destroys
the property of others, without compensa-
tion to them. The constitution of the
State forbids the public from directly tak-
ing, injuring ordestroying the property of
another, without indemnifying the latter,
but the mine owner, because his business
is useful to the public, may prosecute it at
the expense of his neighbors' property
rights, without giving a compensation.
One might have supposed that if the busi-
nes of mining could not be carried on
without encroaching on th6 property of
others, the profits of the business should
in some equitable way be divided between
those whose property was thus, without
their consent, made to assist, and the mine
owner. The interest of the public would
bave, it is true, forbidden an injunction
against the taking, but for that very rea-
son, the owner whose property was, despite
lils non-consent, made to contribute to the
business, should, in the form of damages,
have been requitted for the contribution.
In railroad cases, and other cases in-
volving eminent domain, a similar failure
to recover adequate compensation may be
noticed. From the initial damages for the
taking are excluded diminutions of value,
arising from sundry causes, and for these
diminutions the recovery of damages in
later actions of trespass is also excluded.
The principle of Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Sanderson was not so satisfactory that
there has been any anxiety to apply it to
other cases. The court of equity would
probably not enjoin Enstein from making
his bricks on the land whence he dug the
clay, but the court of law would not allow
the chancellor's reasons to induce the with-
holding of damages also. The business, it
would say, is respectable, useful. lawful.
It cannot well be conducted elsewhere than
where the clay is found. It cannot well
be sci conducted that smoke and gas will
not escape upon the adjacent lands and in-
jure flhe crops thereon. Nevertheless, if
this use of Thorpe's land, in the manufac-
ture of the bricks, is necessary, Enstein
must pay for it. Enstein is not forbidden
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thus to dominate Thorpe's land; but,
when he does so, he must compensate
Thorpe. This is a sensible view. It would
be a pity to prevent Enstein's clay being
made into bricks, because, by so doing,
Thorpe's land would cease to raise wheat,
but it is equally a pity to prevent Thorpe's
land from raising wheat in order that En-
stein's clay might be turned into bricks.
Wheat growing and brick making are both
laudable, useful, indispensable avocations,
and the use of land for both purposes is
equally commendable, but there is no more
reason for making Thorpe's land servient
to Enstein's avocation, than for making
Enstein's servient to Thorpe's.
The servitude which Thorpe implies is a
passive servitude. Enstein must refrain
from using his land in certain ways, be-
cause, in so doing, he sends material sub-
stances over and upon Thorpe's land. En-
stein must simply refrain from sending
these noxious substances upon Thorpe's
land. The servitude which Enstein de-
sires to establish, is an active one. He
wishes the right to send these poisonous
particles over Thorpe's land, even without
making compensation for it. It is enough
to concede to him the exemption from pro-
hibition thus to subjugate Thorpe's land,
without, in addition, consenting that he
shall subjugate it wholly for his own ad-
vantage, and without any indemnity to
Thorpe.
The cases cited by the learned court be-
low sustain its conclusion. Cf. Gavigan v.
Atlantic Refining Co., 186 Pa. 604.
BOLTON vs. IRONS.
BReal property-Dower, lien of-The effect
of a sale of the land upon the lien and on
unpaid instalments.
STATEMENT OF THECASE.
A died seised ofa farm. His heirs joined
in a conveyance to B, subject to the pay-
ment to C, widow of A, of annually the
interest of J the purchase money during
her life and at her death to'the heirs of A.
B subsequently died and proceedings in
partition were had on his estate and the
farm conveyed to him by A was allotted
to D, a child of B, and a recognizance had
for I of the valuation money, the interest
of which is payable to E, widow of B, for
life and at her death to her children.
D sells the farm to H, who fails to pay
the interest to C. Proceedings were in-
stituted to collect it and a judgment re-
covered. I purchased at the sale on this
judgment; an action brought by E to
recover the interest secured by the re-
cognizance; I claims that he took the
land discharged of all liens.
KEELOR and CLAYCOMB for plaintiff.
A release of dower must be made by an
instrument under seal. Gray v. McCune,
23 Pa. 447; Murphy v. Borland, 92 Pa. 86;
Van Strochs estate, 5 Kulp 389; Gourley
v. Kenley, 66 Pa. 270.
CoRE and WATSON for defendant.
A sale under an order of an Orphans"
Court divests dower. Scot v. Croasdale,
1 Yeates 75; Mitchell ' Mitchell, 8 Pa.
126; Grant v. Hook, 13 S. and R. 262;
Helfrich v. Ohermyer, 15 Pa. 113.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
Dower is that interest or estate which is
provided by the law for the widow out of
the reai property of the husband at com-
mon law, and generally in this country it
is an estate for life in one-third of his
lands, tenements, and hereditaments.
The dower right of a widow cannot be de-
feated unless she commits such an action
that will be a bar to her recovery for dower.
Her dower right may also be defeated" in
the following ways: (1) byjoiningin a deed
with her husband; (2) by obtaining a di-
vorce; (3) by loss of the husband's seisin,
whether by the assertion of a paramount ti-
tle ,the breach of a condition, or the expira-
tion of the limitation. In the case at bar,
the widow, E, has done nothing to bar
her right to dower, but the question be-
fore us for decision, is, whether or not, I
takes the land free from all liens. After
thoroughly examining the cases in this
state we find that there are none quite
similar to the one at bar, but the law re-
lating to dower is the same. If a recogni-
zance or other collateral security has been
taken for the widow's interest, she may
maintain the appropriate action there-
upon. Myers v. Brodbeck, 110 Pa. 198.
The widow may recover the interest on
the money charged on the land by dis-
tress or otherwise, as rents are recoverable.
Davidson's Appeal, 95 Pa. 394; Heller's
Appeal, 116 Pa. 534. And again, she may
maintain an action of assumpsit or debt,
against a terre-tenant, for arrears of dower.
Deifendefer v. Eshleman, 113 Pa. 305;
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Lerch v. Snyder, 112 Pa. 161; The Borough
of York v. Welsh, 117 Pa. 174. In the case
at bar C, widow of A, recovered judgment
because her interest was not paid. She had
no recognizance bond or any collateral se-
curity. A recognizance is not necessary to
make a lien for dower. A widow's dower
right follows the land no matter whether
sold at sheriff's sale or private sale. A pur-
chaser is presumed to have notice of such
right of widow. Dr. Trickett in his work
on "Liens" distinctly states and cites cases
as authority, that a lien follows the land,
and where a sheriff's sale takes place prior
.to widow's death, the purchaser takes sub-
ject to the duty of paying the interest on
that sum to the widow. Trickett on
Liens, vol. 3, page 542; Hebner v. Shirk,
2 Walker 165. A widow whose interest in
her husband's estate is secured by a recog-
nizance may enforce the payment of in-
terest due her, (Act of March 29, 1832 P.
L.), by distress or otherwise as rents in
this commonwealth are recovered. Evans
and Shearer v. Ross, 107 Pa. 231; De,
Haven v. Bartholmen, 57 Pa. 156. After
a careful search of the subject of "Widow's
Dower," both at common law and in Penn-
sylvania, we cannot find any thing in
support of I's claim, that he took free from
all liens. We are of the opinion lhat E is
entitled to her one-third interest of the
purchase money payable annually. Judg-
ment is accordingly granted in favor of E.
L. B. C. DELANEY, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The charge in favor of the first widow of
the first decedent,was made by the deed un-
der which the land was conveyed to Bolton.
When at the death of Bolton, partition of
his estate was made, the land was allotted
to his son David, who entered into a re-
cognizance for one-third of the valuation,
of which the interest was to be annually
paid to Mrs. Bolton. David sold the land
to Holmes. He omitted to pay the instal-
ments due to the first widow, who there-
upon sued him, obtained judgment, and
caused a judicial sale of the land to Irons.
Irons now fails to pay the interest due to
the second widow, Mrs. Bolton, contend-
ing that her dower was divested by the sale
at which ie became purchaser. The learn-
ed court below has rejected his contention,
and entered judgment for the plaintiff.
We are unable to reach the same conclusion.
A sale on a lien later than dower, will
discharge the arrears of dower then due,
but not the dower. Plumer's Appeal, 11
W. N. C. 144; 3 Liens, 541. A sale on a
judgment or decree for an instalment of
dower will discharge the instalments then
mature, but not the dower itself, nor in-
stalments thereafter to fall due. Jones'
Appeal, 14 W. N. 0.813; Tospon v. Sipes,
116 Pa. 588.
The question before us is different. It
is whether a sale for an instalment of an
earlier dower, will cut off, divest the later
dower.
The principle is perhaps universal, that
a sale necessary to secure satisfaction of an
earlier lien, divests all later liens. Thus a
sale on second mortgage will divest the
third mortgage, though not the first. If
the sale on'the second mortgage were sub-
ject to the third, the third would in fact
be preferred to the second. The purchaser
would pay only the price of the land di-
minished by the first and third mortgages.
The second mortgage would take only
what was left. If no purchaser would pay
more than the sum of the first and third
mortgages, there could be'no sale.
It matters not whether the sale is for the
-whole of the first mortgage or only for one
of several bonds secured by it. The sale
would divest the whole of the second mort-
gage, and the proceeds would be applied
pi-o rata to all the bonds, as well those not
sued as that on which the suit was founded.
Nor can it matter that the first charge
is a dower, and that a sale for an instal-
ment will 'not divest -the dower itself.
Both the dower principal and the annual
instalments are charges prior in virtue to
a later dower, or other charge. If the land
cannot be sold on a judgment for annual
instalments, except as saddled with a later
dower, the first widow might be precluded
from ever obtaining payment. Should the
land become worth no more than the sec-
ond charge, no purchaser would buy it.
To the dower fund was originally attached
a right to appropriate the whole value of
the land to the widow and heirs. If a sec-
ond dower can be created which shall
cleave inseparably to that land, the first
dower now attaches virtually only to the
difference between the whole value of the
land and the second dower charge.
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We know not for how much Irons bought
the land. He had a right to assume that
all charges subsequent to the first widow's
dower would be divested, and that the
price bid by him would represent its full
value less anterior charges, and the prin-
cipal of the first -dower. If, after paying
the instalments then due on the first dow-
er, there remained anything, it was the
duty of the owner of the second dower
fund to see that this remainder was prop-
erly invested, in order that it might yield
an annual payment to Mrs. Bolton. To
this remainder, and not to Irons, the pur-
chaser, it was necessary to look. It follows
that Irons holds the land free from Mrs.
Bolton's dower, and he cannot be com-
pelled to pay the instalments falling due
since his purchase.
Judgment reversed, and judgment for
the defendant.
BROWN vs. DIX'S ADMINISTRATOR.
Decedents' estates-Advancements, how
distinguished from gifts-Declarations
of decedent as evidence of either
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Mrs. Dix died in 1902 leaving four sons
and daughters; and children of a deceased
daughter. In 1899 Mrs. Dix gave to each
of her four living children $10,000, or the
equivalent in real estate. Soon after this
she told one of her grand-daughters, in
the presence of one of her daughters, that
she intended all to have the same, "that
the grand-children were to have what
would have gone to their mother, if she
had been living." Also told her sister
that she intended to give the grand-chil-
dren the same amount, but she didn't
want to give it to them until they needed
it. That they were then too young.
The administrator claims she intended it
a gift. Brown, guardian of the children,
brings this action to recover the $10,000 due
them, claiming it was an advancement.
JoNEs and EBBERT for plaintiff.
Whether a transfer of property is a gift
or an advancement is a question of inten-
tion of the parent at the time the transfer
was made.. Merkel's Appeal, 89 Pa. 340;
Eshelman's Estate, 135 Pa. 160; Miller's
Appeal, 40 Pa. 57; Lawson's Appeal, 23
Pa. 85.
To establish this intention the declara-
tions of the parent at the time of making
the transfer are admissible in evidence.
Frey v. Heydt, 116 Pa. 601 ; Weaver's Ap-
peal, 63 Pa. 309; Harris' Appeal, 2 Grant
304.
LONGDOTTOm and YEAGLEY for defend-
ant.
An absolute transfer of property by a
parent to a child is presumed in the first'
instance to be a gift. Kerley's Appeal,
109 Pa. 41; Candor's Appeal, 27 Pa. 119.
The declarations of the parent are inad-
missible unless shown to be part of the
resgestae. Frey v. Heydt, 116 Pa. 601.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
An absolute transfer of property by a
parent to a child, in the absence of explan-
atory circumstances, is presumed in the
first instance to be a gift. An advance-
ment is simply a gift wilh a condition at-
tached and when such a condition was not
expressly annexed by the donor, the bur-
den is upon him who alleges that one was
intended.
In discharge of this duty, the plaintiff
offered certain declarations of Mrs. Dix,
the donor, made subsequently to the date
of the transaction. They were objected to
on the ground that they were not part of
the res gestae.
Advancement is a question of intent and
such intent must be proven to have been
present in the mind of the donor at the
time of the transfer. Merkel's Appeal, 89
Pa. 340; Frey v. Heydt, 116 Pa. 601. De-
clarations of the parent at the time or with-
in such a period thereafter as would con-
stitute them part of the res gestae are ad-
missible to prove the nature of the gift in-
tended. Merkel's Appeal, supra; Frey v.
Heydt, suipra. The cases do hold that sub-
sequent declarations are admissible to cor-
roborate the acts of the donor at the time
of the trafisaction when such acts them-
selves indicate that an advancement was
intended. See Merkel's Appeal, supra, and
Frey v. Heydt, supra. No such acts, how-
ever, are present in this case and no de-
cision has been brought to our notice in
which it was held that the declarations of
a donor made after the transfer of property
by him are admissible to impeach what
otherwise was an absolute gift. As be-
tween the donor and donee the rights
of the latter are as perfect as those of a pur-
ctlaser for value and it would not be con-
tended that a purchaser's title or rights in
goods could be in any way impeached by
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the ex parte declarations of the vendor.
The fact that the first declaration was
made in the presence of one of the donees
does not affect the admissibility of the
same since it was not assented to and as-
sent, which renders the declaration in ef-
fect an admission by the donee, is the only
ground upon which it would be admis-
sible. Harris's Appeal, 2 Grant 804.
Again, the identity of the daughter
being undisclosed, it would be impossible
to charge anyone of them with the effect
of the declaration.
The second declaration, in fact, is irrel-
evant for the purpose offered. It was not
a statement of the donor's state of mind at
the time of the transaction, tending to
throw light upon the same but merely the
declaration, of a present intention to give
the grand-children a certain sum when
they needed it.
Neither of the declarations, therefore,
are competent evidence.
The plaintiff further contends thatjudg-
ing the amount and character of the gift.
an advancement will be presumed. The
facts do not disclose the value of Mrs.
Dix's estate atthe time or at any othertime.
All that is stated is that $10,000 was given
by her to fourofher children. Although the
amount given to each was large in compari-
son to the average person's estate, can we
safely presume that Mrs. Dix acted unnatu-
rally and gave to her children an amount
which in proportion to her estate was so
large that an advancement would be the
only safe inference? We think not. To
hold, in the absence of knowledge of the
value of Mrs. Dix's estate, that she in-
tended to make an advancement, would
be to attribute to her conduct unbecoming
the average parent, who does not give to a
child an amount which, in view of his es-
tate, is so large that the law will presume
that an advancement was intended.
The reason upon which the rule is based
is the best answer to the request for its ap-
plication in this case.
Then as to the nature of the subject mat-
ter of the gift. A grant of land by a
parent tola child isprimafaoie an advance-
ment: Lewis's Appeal, 127 Pa. 127. The
facts state that Mrs. Dix "gave to each
of her living children $10,000, or the equiv-
alent in real estate." What part of the
$10,000 represented realty? Unless we can
discover a positive answer to this question
from the facts themselves, the presump-
tion cannot be raised. The facts do not
contain it.




OPINION OF THE SUPREMdE COURT.
We see no error in the judgment of the
learned court below. This is an action in
the common pleas against the administra-
tor to recover an advancement which the
deceased is alleged to have intended to
make, but did not make. There is no
precedent for such on action. The disap-
pointed grand-children may, in" the dis-
tribution of the fund in the administra-
tor's hands in the Orphans' Court, insist
that the advancements made to the four
children shall be regarded as anticipatory
payments pro lanto of their shares of the
estate, and that thus the portions of the
money actually undergoing distribution,
to be paid to the grand-children, shall be
enlarged. There is no other remedy.
Conveyance, of land, gratuitously by a
parent or by another at his instance, and
for a consideration furnished by him, are,
in the absence of a different intention,
taken to be advancements. The evidence
unfortunately does not show how large a
part of the alleged advancement was in
I he form of land, nor to which of the four
children land was conveyed. We cannot
find from it, therefore, which of the four
children was advanced, nor -to what ex-
tent any of them was advanced.
The intention to advance must exist
when the transfer of property to a child
by the parent is made. The declaration
of Mrs. Dix after the gift to the four chil-
dren, that she intended all the children to
have the same, the children of the deceased
daughter taking what would have gone to
their mother, could not well qualify the gift
already made. Further discussion of the
case is unnecessary. We are satisfied that




MINOR vs. IMPERIAL CO.
Trespass-Malicious prosecution-Proba-
ble cause-Exemplary damages-Liabil-
ity of master for actions of servant.
STATEMENT. OF THE CASE.
Minor purchased articles at the store of
the defendant, paying for them. They
were sent to his home in the defendant's
wagon, the driver being instructed to col-
lect the money before delivery. The goods
were handed to Minor with the statement
that the price, $4.23, was to be paid.
Minor replied that he had paid. The
driver declaring that his orders were nt
to leave the goods unless they were p.id
for, demanded them back. Minor refusing
to deliver them, and excitedly resisting
the driver, the latter went off and made
information against Minor for larceny.
Brought before the justice he was com-
mitted for trial. Subsequently on habeas
corpus he was discharged.
The president of the company appeared
at the hearing and stated the facts, de-
daring that a mistake of a servant of the
company had been made in directing the
driver to collect.
This action is brought for a malicious
prosecution and the court allowed the jury
to assess vindictive damages.
ALBERTSON and HILLYER for the plain-
Iiff.
Punitive damages are assessable in Pa.
Porter v. Seller, 23 Pa. 424; Heiling v.
Henderson, 161 Pa. 553.
Release of defendant by habeas corpus
is sufficient termination of the prosecu-
tion. Zebley v. Storey, 117 Pa. 478.
Malice may be inferred from want of
probable cause. Bigelow on Torts, pp. 107;
Deitz v. Longfitt, 63 Pa. 234; Bunor v.
Dunlap, 94 Pa. 239.
Belief in a right to do a certain act will
not shield a party from punitive damages,
if the act is done in a wanton or reckless
manner. A. & E. Eno. of Law 2nd Ed.,
vol. 12 pp. 25; Dalton v. Beers, 38 Conn.
529.
DIVELY and KNAPPENBERGER for the
defendant.
Probable cause for the institution of a
criminal proceeding is the existence of
facts sufficient to induce in the mind of a
reasonable man, a belief in the guilt of the
accused.
Cooper v. Hart & Co., 147 Pa. 594; Smith
v. Ege, 52 Pa. 419. Excessive fraud, want-
onness, or other circumstances to call for
exemplary damages, do not appear. R.
R. Co. v. Kelly, 31 Pa. 372. Agent acted
without the scope of his authority. hence
the company is not liable. Clark on Corp.
p. 526 ; R. R. Co. v. Brewer, 78 Md. 394.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
This was an action of trespass to recover
damages for a malicious prosecution insti-
tuted by the defendant against the plain-
tiff.
The first question that presents itself is:
is this company liable for the conduct of
this servant, and was this servant acting
in the scope of the company's authority,
and was he clothed with the right to pursue
the course that he did? If he was clothed
with this right expressly or impliedly then
the company is liable. The principle of
the rule is stated byAndrews, J., Rounds v.
Delaware & L. W. 1. Co'. 64 N. Y. 129, as
follows: "Where authority is conferred to
act for another without special limitation,
it carries with it, by implication, authority
to do all things necessary to its execution;
and when it involves the discretion of the
servant of the use of force towards or
against another, the use of such discretion
or force is a part of the thing authorized,
and, when exercised, becomes, as to third
persons, the discretion of the act of the
master. The master who puts theservant
in a place of trust or responsibility, orcom-
mits to him the management of his busi-
ness or the care of his business or the care
of his property, is justly held responsible
when the servant, through lack of judg-
meat or discretion or from infirmity of
temper, or under the influence of passion,
aroused by the circumstances and the oc-
casion, goes beyond the strict line of his
duty or authority, and inflicts an unjusti-
fiable injury upon another."
To sustain an action for a malicious pros-
ecution there are three essential elements
necessary to be established or the action
will fall. There must be (1) a termina-
tion of the prosecution; (2) want of prob-
able cause; (3) malice.
First, there was such a termination of
the prosecution as would allow the defend-
ant to maintain this action. Abell v.
Charles, Brightly 131, holds that a dis-
charge on habeas corpus puts an end to a
criminal prosecution, so as to enable the
defendant therein to maintain an action
for malicious prosecution. Zerby v. Story,
117 Pa. 489.
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Second, there was want of probable
cause. Probable cause, is a reasonable
ground of suspicion, supported by circum-
stances sufficient to warrant an ordinarily
prudent man in believing the party guilty
of the offense. Probable cause is shown
for a prosecution for larceny, where it ap-
pears that the person accused has taken the
prosecutor's property and is unable to give
a reasonable excuse for not returning it.
Mitchel v. Logan, 172 Pa. 349; McClafferty
v. Philip, 151 Pa. 86. Observe the conduct
of this driver when he delivered the goods
to the plaintiff, and demanded the money
for them. The plaintiff told him that he
had paid for them, but the driver denied.
Simply on the ground that a servant had
given him orders to collect the money for
the goods, he demands the goods back
which the plaintiff refused to hand over
but deliberately and excitedly resisted the
driver as any man would have done under
the circumstances. The plaintiff had as
much right to claim the goods on the
ground that he had paid for them, as the
driver had to believe that they were not
paid for and that he still had a right to
hold them for the company. The facts of
the case suggest that the plaintiff had
more right to hold the goods, as surely a
man is conscious of his own acts, while the
driver had only the instructions of a ser-
vant.
The duty of the driver was to return to
the store and ascertain if the goods were
paid for, and learn if the plaintiff was the
rightful owner of the goods, and then and
there have settled all controversy, as a
prudent man would have done, but in-
stead of so doing he hurries off to a justice
and makes an information against the
plaintiff for larceny. The defendant was
not justified in pursuing the course that
he did when he had nosubstantial ground
for his conduct. And the conclusion is
that there is want of probable cause.
Third, there was malice, and this point
does not need any discussion, as malice
need not be proved; it may be inferred
from want of probable cause. Abrahams
v. Cooper, 81 Pa. 235; Leahey v. March,
155 Pa. 458.
The court allowed the jury to assess
vindictive damages. Lake Shore & Mich.
S. R'y v. Rosenzurg, 113 Pa. 535, holds
that a corporation is liable for exemplary
damages for the acts of its servant done
within the scope of his authority, under
circumstances which would give such
right to the plaintiffas against the servant,
were the suit against, him instead of the
company. Exemplary damages, are al-
lowed only where the act complained of
had been committed willfully and mali-
ciously, or, in the absence of actual malice.
and where it has been committed under
circumstances of violence, oppression, out-
rage, or wanton recklessness. Nagle v.
Mullison, 34 Pa. 48.
Was it proper for the court to give the
jury the right to decide the question of
vindictive damages? In Amer v. Long-
streth, 10 Barr 145, Justice Bell said that
in an action for trespass, the jury are not
confined to the actual damage sustained;
they may go beyond that, if the case shows
a wanton invasion ofthe plaintiff's rights,
or of any circumstances of aggravation or
outrage. This is for thejury to determine,
and, within reasonable bounds, it is a
matter within their control. Upon no
principle of law or equity, is the jury per-
mitted to go beyond compensation in
damages unless in cases of gross oppres-
sion or aggravation when the jury may
asses vindictive damages. Rossv. Story,
1 Barr 190. The jury and not the court
are to determine whether it is a proper
case for exemplary damages. Nagle v.
Mullison, supra.
Therefore, the opinion of the court is
that the jury was properly allowed to as-
sess vindictive damages.
MOWRY, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The articles purchased by Minor, were
conveyed to his home by the wagon of the
defendant, the driver of which was in-
structed to collect the money before de-
livery. It was his task then, when he
discovered that Minor, after receiving the
goods, was not going to pay for them, to
demand them back, and possibly to take
them. Minor's resistance prevented the
retaking of them. Thereupon the driver
went off and made information against
Minor. In doing so are we to understand
that he represented the company?
There is no affinity between the ordinary
work of a wagon-driver and that of insti-
tuting criminal prosecutions for his em-
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ployer. The company had not expressly
authorized him to do so. He had not on
previous occasions, so far as appears, done
so with the subsequent approbation of the
company. The making of the information
would not be a reasonable means of his
recovering the goods, and discharging his
duty to bring them back, should the price
not be paid. How then can his act be at-
tributed to the defendant? In Central
Railway Co. v. Brewer, 78 Md. 394, Clark,
Corporations, p. 526, it was held that a
street railway company was not liable for
a malicious prosecution of a passenger even
by its president and superintendent, on a
charge of dropping a lead nickel in the
fare box, unless he had express authority,
or his act was ratified by the company.
In Craver v. Bloomingdale, 171 N. Y. 439,
the jury were permitted to find the de-
fendant liable, because there was evidence
from the conduct of the business through
the intervention of the driver, etc., of his
authority to do the act. We think it was
error to allow the jury to attribute to the
defendant, the act of the driver.
Nor are we convinced that it was proper
to permit the jury to assess vindicatory
damages. The driver was misinformed,
through the mistake of his employer. He
was not bound to believe Minor's decla-
ration that he had paid for the goods. He,
probably, had no knowledge of Minor,
and it was not absurd for him to suspect
that the latter was lying in order tojustify
his retention of the goods without paying
for them. Minor had excitedly resisted
the driver, when he demanded the goods
back. He should have allowed them to
be taken back, or should have paid for
them a second time, and awaited rectifica-
tion of the error, when he should have a
conference with the defendant. He knew
that the delivery of the goods by the driver
was only on the condition that they
should be paid for, and he had no right to
retain them, if unwilling to comply with
that condition. In the face of the conduct
of Minor, and with his own conviction
that Minor had not paid for the goods, it
is not strange that the driver believed
that Minor was intending to secure them
without paying for them.
It is true that the jury is to say whether
the facts call for exemplary damages; but
a precondition to their decision that they
do is that there shall be sufficient evidence
of malice, fraud, outrage, oppression or
vindictiveness on the part of the driver.
We fail to find such evidence.
Judgment reversed.
JOHN DOE vs. ROBERT REESE AND
GEORGE BLANK, AUDITORS OF
FELL BOROUGH.
Borough officers-Collateral attack of a de
facto official's acts-Such attack not per-
rnitted-Report of borough auditors con-
firmed-atification of acts done in the
absence of a quorum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Fell borough consisted of three wards,
and there were three councilmen elected
from eqch ward. March 5, 1901, when
the council met to organize, there were
nine of the councilmen present before the
meeting opened. Four of them left be-
fore the roll was called, and five of them
answered the roll call. Immediately after
roll call and before any business was done,
one of the five left the room and went
home, leaving four of the councilmen
present.
The remaining councilmen proceeded to
organize, claiming that as the one that
left had answered to roll call, they bad a
quorum, and by instructions of the remain-
lug councilmen, the clerk marked the
councilmen that had left and gone home,
as voting in the affirmative on all ques-
tions and a full quota of borough officers
were elected.
At the next meeting of council, the full
number were present, and one of the coun-
cilmen that had been absent the previous
meeting, moved that the proceedings of
the previous meeting be ratified. This
motion passed by an unanimous vote.
Business proceeded in the regular order,
bills were paid, and the auditors reported
as having audited the affairs and finding
them correct. John Doe excepts to this re-
port on the ground that the organization
was illegal and the motion to ratify it did
not correct it, consequently all business
done was illegal.
GERBER and DEVER for the exceptants.
BRENNAN and SHERBINE contra.
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OPINION OF THE COURT.
Before the meeting of council, on March
5, 1901, nine councilmen were present.
Four of them left before roll-call, and five
answered to the call. Immediately after
roll-call, one of these five left the room and
went home. There remained, therefore,
but four councilmen present.
Four are not a majority of nine, and the
presence of a majority of the nine was
necessary to the transaction of any busi-
ness. It may have been the duty of the
other five to remain, but this duty is not.
the equivalent of actually remaining.
The borough is not represented by but
four councilmen, and acts of these four
are not its acts
It seems that the secretary has men-
tioned in the minutes the fact that five
answered to the roll-call. He has not
mentioned the subsequent withdrawal of
one of them. On the contrary he falsified
the record by noting that this in fact ab-
sent member voted affirmatively on all
questions.
The four members, claiming, with the
member who had left after roll-call, to be
a quorum, proceeded to elect the borough
officers, a treasurer, a secretary, etc. The
four corporally present, and the ghostly
fifth, unanimously elected A for the
first of these offices and B for the second.
At the next meeting of council, all being
present, one of those who had been absent
at, the former meeting, moved that the
proceedings of that meeting be ratified.
The law prescribes no formalities for the
election of these officers. Formal nomina-
tion is unnecessary. The voting may be
viva voce or by ballot, as the council may
choose. Though the time prescribed for
organization had elapsed, it was not im-
possible effectively to elect. Common-
wealth v. Steele, 2 North 1. To "ratify"
the election to office of A, would be a vir-
tual election of him to that office. What-
ever imperfection inhered in the original
election would be made innocuous by a
second election, in which, too, the vote
was unanimous. A is the treasurer of the
borough of Fell.
But, suppose that he has not been regu-
larly elected. He has nevertheless been
chosen, first by four, and secondly by the
unanimous ratification of their choice.
Let this be an irregular designation to the
office. It is nevertheless, a designation.
A has entered upon the duties of the of-
fice. He is a de facto, if not a de jure
treasurer. As such, he has paid bills
drawn upon him. It is a well settled
principle that the acts of a defacto officer
cannot be collaterally attacked. Shartzer
v. School District, 90 Pa. 192; Campbell
v. Commonwealth, 96 Pa. 344; Common-
wealth v. Valsalka, 181 Pa. 17; King v.
Phila. Co., 154 Pa. 160; Keyser v. McKei-
san, 2 R. 139; Clark v. Commonwealth,
29 Pa. 129.
What else than a collateral attack is at-
tempted here? The treasurer has submit-
ted his account to the borough auditors,
and they have approved of his payments.
The decision of the auditors will not estop
any citizen from subsequently contesting
A's tenure of the office, if right to contest
they would otherwise have. So long as A
is acting as treasurer he should account to
the auditors, and no appeal can succeed
which denies his right to credits, while
holding him subject to debits.
The proper way to determine A's right
to the office is a quo warranto. It cannot
be inquired into by the auditors or by the
Common Pleas on appeals from their re-
port.
The exceptions to the report of the bor-
ough auditors are dismissed, and the report
is approved and confirmed.
